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ABSTRACT 
Media representations play a role in how one perceives a particular space . 
The American media presented the American military bases in Okinawa during 
the period of American civil administration ( 1945-1972) as necessary and 
beneficial for the Okinawan people . Because the media linked the bases and the 
United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) as dependent 
upon one another , the media considered the benefits brought to Okinawa by the 
existence ofUSCAR a result of the bases as well. Despite Okinawan resistance to 
both USCAR and the military bases, the press presented the Okinawan people as 
actually wanting the United States presence in Okinawa. The press represented 
protesters as the minority . As United States changed its policy towards Okinawa 
over the course of the existence of US CAR, the media changed the representation 
of the military bases to meet the new American policy. 
nns THESIS PROJECT MEETS IN MAGNITUDE AND QUALITY THE 
DEPARTMENT'S TANDARDS FOR HONORS IN IDSTORY. 
JOHN L. GORDON, JR. 
COORDINATOR, IDSTORY HONORS PROGRAM 
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When one writes, talks, or reads about Okinawa today, it is virtually 
impossible to avoid the topic of the United States military bases on the islands. 
The military bases have become an integral part of the historical narrative of 
Okinawa and have been since their inception after the end of World War II. 
Throughout the period of United States governance of the islands, to the reversion 
of the islands back to Japan in 1972, to the end of the Cold War, on through to 
today, the media representation has helped to change the way in which the 
military bases are viewed and utilized within the historical framework. 
What is presented here then is not a history of the actions and events of a 
people or nation, but rather, in a sense, a documentation of how peoples and 
nations have located the military bases within their own interpretations of 
Okinawan history. Also, while more common histories of the military base 
presence on Okinawa document the thoughts and perceptions of the governments 
involved (the United States, Japan, or Ryukyu) or the Okinawan people, little 
attention has been paid to the presentation of the Okinawa problem outside 
Okinawa. 
I will, therefore, focus my history on the presentation of the debate 
surrounding the United States military bases on Okinawa within The New York 
Times. The New York Times has been chosen because it is considered a national 
newspaper, so the audience is large. Secondly, it is generally considered to be a 
prestigious newspaper, so the views and debates within it can be assumed, with a 
certain amount of error, to represent an average of what other media is presenting . 
The period of United States civil administration of Okinawa will be the primary 
focus. Though the United States' military bases have remained in place well 
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beyond the reversion of Okinawa back to Japan, the period of American civil 
administration provides a smaller frame of time to allow for a closer examination 
of the media representation. 
As Akio Watanabe notes in his discussion of the Japanese press over the 
same time period in Okinawa Problem, the media plays a large role in how public 
opinion within a space is formed. It is certainly not the only contributing factor, 
but it does offer a good idea of what the Japanese public is exposed to regarding 
certain issues and debates. Watanabe's argument centers around the creation of 
the anti-base movement in mainland Japan and, thus, how the media represents 
the military bases and the United States as undemocratic, a colonial presence, and 
so on. 1 In the United States, many people only know where Okinawa is because 
of the Battle of Okinawa, and there has been no political movements in the United 
States associated with the Okinawa problem. The United States public could be 
said to be apathetic in many respects. The question then must be how did the 
press help to maintain or enhance those feelings of apathy? Okinawa was 
essentially an American colony for twenty seven-years. At least two United States 
policy makers referred in private to Okinawa as a colony: Edwin Reischauer, the 
Ambassador to Japan from 1961 through 1966, and George Ball, the 
Undersecretary of State for John F. Kennedy. 2 One might think that a 
democractic society such as the United States would have some apprehension 
over their involvement in Okinawa, yet this was not the case. 
1 Akio Watanabe, The Okinawa Problem (Carlton, Australia: Melbourne University, 1970), 150. 
2 Laura Hein and Mark Selden, "Culture, Power, and Identity in Contemporary Okinawa," in 
Islands of Discontent: Okinawan Responses to Japanese and American Power, ed. Laura Hein and Mark 
Selden, 1-35 (Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield, 2003), 19. 
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It is necessary to clarify terminology. Okinawa was once the independent 
kingdom of the Ryukyus. The Ryukyus, therefore, is the technical name for the 
entire group of islands. The largest island in the grouping is named Okinawa. 
However , when the Japanese made the Ryukyus a prefecture in 1879, Japan 
renamed the islands Okinawa Prefecture. During the United States civil 
administration, the United States again called the islands Ryukyu, but since 
reversion to Japan, the name was changed to Okinawa Prefecture once more. 
Thus today, the names Okinawa and Ryukyu are treated as synonymous. I am 
predominantly using the name Okinawa, but when discussing specific matters 
pertaining to United States policy during the period of the civil administration, I 
will also refer to the islands as the Ryukyus. Thus, the two terms are synonymous 
for my purposes as well. 
Okinawa is mainly known to the American people because of the Battle of 
Okinawa in World War II. It is widely said that the battle was one of the largest 
and bloodiest of the war. The Okinawan civilian population suffered more 
casualties in the battle than either the American or Japanese armies with an 
estimated 150,000 killed of a total population of around 500,000. 3 Despite the 
fact that the Americans were the invaders, the Okinawans typically place the 
blame on the Japanese and the Japanese army for the majority of the civilian 
deaths. Masahide Ota's essay "Re-examining the History of the Battle of 
Okinawa" is primarily aimed at comparing the roles of the American and 
Japanese militaries in the battle, and through this comparison, noting the extreme 
3 Masahide Ota, Essays on Okinawa Problems (Okinawa, Japan: Yui Shuppan, 2000) , 22, 32. 
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contrast between the preparedness of the American military and its treatment of 
Okinawan civilians to the lack of preparation of the Japanese military and its 
mistrust of the Okinawan civilian population. 
The relative good light in which the Okinawans held the Americans did 
not last for long, however. On April 1, 1945 Admiral Chester Nimitz suspended 
Japan's authority over Okinawa. The Potsdam Declaration in July of 1945 left 
Okinawa's status ambiguous. While Japan was to be considered the "islands of 
Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we [United 
States, Britain, Soviet Union, and France] determine," whether or not Okinawa 
was to lie within the minor islands to be determined was not made clear. 
However, in November of 1945, the decision of the American Joint Chiefs of 
Staff on the administration of the Ryukyus was that it was to remain separate from 
the administration of Japan, primarily because the United States already had a 
military government established in Okinawa prior to Japan's surrender. 4 Also, 
during the Battle of Okinawa, the American military propaganda directed at the 
Okinawans was meant to separate Okinawa and Okinawans as distinct from the 
Japanese. The Americans painted the Japanese as economic and political 
exploiters of Okinawa. 5 During the battle, the propaganda was meant to serve to 
unite the Okinawans with the United States against the Japanese. Following the 
battle, the United States government persisted in thinking of the Okinawans as 
distinct from Japanese. While there was some debate between the Joint Chiefs of 
4 Kensei Yoshida, Democracy Betrayed : Okinawa Under U.S. Occupation (Bellingham, WA: 
Center for East Asian Studies, Western Washington University, 2001), 18. 
5 Watanabe, 20. 
Staff and the State Department regarding Okinawa's status, in the end, the 
military considerations prevailed. 6 
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While the decision to separate Okinawa's administration from that of 
Japan's occurred in 1945, the decision to tum Okinawa into a permanent military 
installation was not made until 1949. Several things led to the United States 
making this decision. There was a communication from the Emperor of Japan in 
1947 that expressed his desire that the United States continue their administration 
of the Ryukyu Islands. The Emperor's gesture was "in exchange for the peace 
settlement [an end to the United States occupation of mainland Japan]." 7 While 
the United States was not immediately interested in the Emperor's offer, since the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff were not yet ready to end the occupation of the Japanese 
mainland, the offer granted the United States a way to maintain control of the 
Ryukyu Islands while not offending the Japanese government, which the United 
States needed as an ally in the quickly building Cold War. 8 The coming 
Communist threat in China served to spur the United States to action in regards to 
the building of permanent military installations on Okinawa. 9 
The construction boom on Okinawa began in 1949. Permanent military 
installations were being built, and in October the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved 
the "Directive for United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands." 
General Douglas MacArthur issued the directive in December of the same year . 
US CAR for short, the new civil administration of the Ryukyu Islands established 
the long term presence of the American military. USCAR's stated goals were 
6 Yoshida, 18-19. 
7 Yoshida, 26. 
8 Yoshida, 26. 
9 Watanabe, 22. 
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humanitarian in nature: establishing a standard of living equal to that before the 
war, establishing a civilian democratic government run by the Okinawan people. 
However, USCAR also made sure that the United States military command was 
truly where the buck stopped. General MacArthur, in his role as Commander-in-
Chief of the Far East, was the "governor" of the Ryukyus. The Commanding 
General of the Ryukyu Command (RYCOM) was made the "deputy-governor." 
The Governor's authority was supreme and absolute. 10 
In the time between the start of the American occupation of Okinawa in 
1945 and the formation of the USCAR, the island had become known as the 
"forgotten island." It was where the United States military sent military personnel 
who were considered bad eggs, or unwanted elsewhere. 11 The local population 
also suffered because of the confusion over the status of Okinawa, and many had 
to resort to stealing military goods, or selling scrap metal left over from the battle 
in order to survive. 12 The adoption ofUSCAR was meant to correct many of the 
problems associated with the military garrison of Okinawa. However, while 
administratively Okinawa could be said to have begun to recover (more funds 
were given to Okinawa in the fiscal year 1950 than in any other year of the 
American occupation and the 49 million United States dollar total was double the 
amount for the previous year) the continued occupation of Okinawan land by 
American military bases remained a source of distrust and resentment among the 
10 Yoshida, 42. 
11 Ota, 204-205. 
12 Atsushi Toriyama,, "Okinawa's 'Postwar': Some Observations on the Formation of American 
Military Bases in the Aftermath of Terrestrial Warfare," Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 4 (December 2003): 
400-418 [online]; available through EBSCOhost Electronic Journals Service, accessed November 12, 2005, 
p. 402. 
7 
Okinawan people. 13 In 1951 the beginnings of the reversion movement were 
formed. The reversion movement advocated the immediate return of Okinawa to 
Japan and an immediate end to the United States occupation of the islands. 14 
The debate between the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
over how Okinawa should be treated politically and militarily was largely 
responsible for the United States delay in beginning construction of the permanent 
facilities on Okinawa . Even after the institution of US CAR, the Department of 
State remained concerned about the Okinawa situation. For instance, Robert G. J. 
Mcclurkin, Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, worried about what 
effect the American military government of Okinawa would have on the 
"American conscience ." 15 On June 5, 1957, the President issued executive order 
10713 to deal with the worries of the State Department. The order abolished the 
positions of governor and deputy-governor, creating the position of High 
Commissioner instead. The High Commissioner was to be appointed by the 
Secretary of Defense after consultation with the State Department and approval of 
the President. The High Commissioner was vested with supreme powers in 
certain areas of government. He was able to veto any bill, promulgate laws or 
ordinances, annul any law, remove any public official from office, grant 
reprieves, pardons, or commutations, and assume "in whole or in part, the 
exercise of full authority in the islands ." 16 The High Commissioner was not 
considered wholly supreme because of his requirement to report to the Secretary 
13 Toriyama, 403. 
14 Toriyama, 404. 
15 Yoshida, 76. 
16 Yoshida , 78-79. 
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of Defense and in tum the Secretary of State. 17 However, his powers in practice 
were virturally absolute. Also, High Commissioner "was the usual title for 'the 
chief officer of a colonial territory or dependency' or 'the head of the British 
diplomatic mission (the High Commission) in a Commonwealth country . ' " 18 
The executive order served to provide the State Department a more 
explicitly defined role in the governing of Okinawa, but the order did not address 
the problems the Okinawans were concerned with. The military bases remained, 
and the High Commissioner's powers were such that the thought of calling 
Okinawa a democracy seemed laughable. 
While the State Department was concerned about the image the United 
States was projecting to other nations, particularly in East Asia, by turning 
Okinawa into what was essentially a United States colony , the aims of the State 
Department were never to eliminate or prevent the building of permanent military 
installations in Okinawa . The Primary reason for the United States presence in 
Okinawa was always strategic. The aims of the State Department were rather to 
project a more favorable image of the United States presence in Okinawa, in order 
to more easily maintain a valued military asset. While USCAR was set up with 
humanitarian goals explicitly stated (returning the economy to its pre-war level, 
establishing a democratic government) , if Okinawa were not considered a key 
strategic outpost in the Pacific, Okinawa would not have had a United States 
presence after the war whatsoever. At the very least, the United States would 
have treated Okinawa as a part of Japan and equal with every other prefecture on 
mainland Japan. 
17 Yoshida, 79. 
18 Yoshida, 77. 
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In order to better understand the kind of position laid out by the articles 
found in The New York Times, it is useful to have something else to compare them 
to. In 1961 the Department of Defense published A Pocket Guide to Okinawa as a 
means to orient troops stationed in Okinawa. The Pocket Guide and its later 
revised version from 1968 are important to understanding the representation of 
the military bases in Okinawa because they exhibit the representation of Okinawa 
that the United States military hoped its troops would accept. The military's 
preferred image of Okinawa was largely a product of United States political 
policy towards its relationship with Okinawa. 
A Pocket Guide to Okinawa's location of the military bases within the 
historical narrative is presented in three different ways. First, the Department of 
Defense presents an orientalized view of Okinawa to the troops. In so doing, it 
establishes the Okinawans not only as the exotic cultural "other" to the United 
States, but also as uncivilized, unadvanced, and unable to develop themselves. 
Second, the Department of Defense paints Okinawa as a key part of United States 
defense against Communist aggression in all of Asia, including Japan and 
Okinawa. Lastly, the Department of Defense attempts to address the discontent of 
the Okinawan people towards the United States. The primary target of the Pocket 
Guide is the land issue. In addressing the land issue directly, the Department of 
Defense was hoping to deflect any criticism the Okinawan people had against the 
United States policies . For the sake of the morale of the troops stationed in 
Okinawa, it was important that the legality of American bases in Okinawa was 
assured and understood. 
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One does not have to look very far within the Pocket Guide to Okinawa to 
discover examples of all three types of arguments, which the United States 
military uses in order to make its points. For instance, within the first page one 
can find statements such as: 
But the Ryukyus have much to offer, not the least of which is the natural 
beauty of a varied landscape. And wherever you go, you will find the 
Ryukyuans friendly and hospitable. These winning traits of the people 
have earned for Okinawa such titles as 'Land of Courtesy' and 'Isle of 
Smiles.' Even the most glum visitor will enjoy the good-natured smiles 
and laughter of the Okinawans. 19 
Obviously, in many ways the military is attempting to sell Okinawa to its troops, 
but in doing so it is orientalizing the Okinawans such that they become the exotic, 
unnaturally happy "other." Orientalism is used here as meant by Edward Said 
who states: 
Orientalism is a style of thought based upon an ontological and 
epistemological distinction made between "the Orient" and (most of the 
time) "the Occident." Thus a very large mass of writers, among whom are 
poets, novelists, philosophers, political theorists, economists, and imperial 
administrators, have accepted the basic distinction between East and West 
as the starting point for elaborate theories, epics, novels, social 
descriptions, and political accounts concerning the Orient, its people, 
customs, "mind," destiny, and so on.20 
The United States fits very neatly into the category of imperialist administrators in 
the case of Okinawa, and thus the exoticization of Okinawa by the Americans is 
not only a means to pique the interest of the troops stationed in Okinawa, but also 
a means to construct the idea of Okinawa as inferior to the United States. 
The orientalization of Okinawa becomes most obvious within the brief 
section of the Pocket Guide dedicated to Okinawan history. The history of 
19 United States Office of Armed Forces Information and Education, A Pocket Guide to Okinawa 
(W ashin~ton: Department of Defense, 1961 ), 1. 
o Edward Said, Orienta/ism (New York: Vintage, 1979), 2. 
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Okinawa is divided into several sections, each categorized by which power was 
ruling Okinawa. Beginning with Chinese influence, moving through Japanese, 
and ending with America's current presence on the island, the historical narrative 
is literally split into categories of subjugation . 21 Some references are made to the 
"Golden Era of Ryukyuan history," but those references are within the context of 
subservience to China. The implication of a nation's "Golden Era" occurring 
under the foot of another power gives the impression the Okinawans are 
dependent upon foreign powers. The impression is one that relates well with the 
United States' desire to legitimize their administration of the islands . 
When dealing with Japanese rule under the Meiji, the Pocket Guide clearly 
portrays Ryukyu as the exotic, backward, and uncivilized other. The Meiji are 
given credit for introducing "well-developed cultural advantages" to Okinawa, 
such as "literature, music, sports, styles, and eventually radio broadcasts and 
motion pictures." 22 Not only are the Westernizing Meiji portrayed as a kind of 
cultural savior for Okinawa, but Okinawa is represented as a willing and happy 
recipient of these so-called great advances. 
In so representing Okinawa, the authors of the Pocket Guide are laying the 
groundwork for providing positive reasons for the United States' own presence in 
Okinawa. Clearly, the argument follows that the Westernizing influence of the 
Meiji Japanese can be furthered and brought to fruition with the presence of the 
United States. Indeed, in discussing the United States presence on Okinawa the 
authors state that: 
In the short span of years since then [World War 11], Okinawa has staged a 
remarkable comeback with the assistance of Americans stationed there 
21 United States Office of Armed Forces Infonnation and Education , 15-22. 
22 United States Office of Armed Forces Infonnation and Education, 19. 
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and financial and technical aid from the United States .... As a result of 
these measures and the hard work of the Okinawans, most Okinawans are 
far better off today than they were before the war. 23 
Furthermore, because the United States claims democracy as the eventual goal of 
its presence in Okinawa, the authors portray the United States as a much more 
advanced influence than the Meiji prior to the United States .24 
When examining articles in The New York Times from the 1950s and 
1960s, one can find that although the paper reports on more specific incidents in 
Okinawa, the overall goals of the articles and slant is fairly consistent with that 
found in the United States military's Pocket Guide. Okinawans are again 
orientalized as the primitive and backward people who are benefiting from the 
United States military presence. While The New York Times does address such 
things as protests against the bases, military training on the islands and the 
reversion movement, those participating in these protests and movements are 
most frequently portrayed as leftist radicals or Communists. 
On January 13, 1959 The New York Times published the article "Ryukyu 
Islands Enjoy Stability." The article details the change from the former 
Ryukyuan currency of the "B Yen" to a totally American dollar based economy. 
While economically speaking, the dollar was certainly a stronger currency than 
the "B Yen" at the time, the designation of the previous R yuk yuan currency as the 
"B Yen" makes it blatantly obvious how its value was judged in relation to both 
the dollar and the Japanese Yen. Again, the Americans are the saviors of the 
Ryukyus, just as in the A Pocket Guide to Okinawa. The military presence itself 
as well as the change in the monetary standard is cited by the article: 
23 United States Office of Armed Forces Information and Education, 26. 
24 United States Office of Armed Forces Information and Education, 34. 
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"approximately 75 per cent of the islands' income [is] derived in some way from 
the United States, with direct sales to the military accounting for about half the 
total. "25 
"Okinawa Key Post in U.S. Defenses," published in The New York Times 
on April 28, I 955, also notes the benefits coming to the Okinawans because of the 
United States presence. Touting improvements to the island such as the 
modernization of its towns (in contrast to the rural housing in areas of Okinawa, 
which the article states are "still grass thatched huts"), the author presents the 
United States as a modernizing force, while also acknowledging the large amount 
of work still to be accomplished .26 The United States' relationship with Okinawa 
is clearly that of a dominant parent figure , teaching a child. The article even 
contains a section titled "U.S. in Complete Control," which details the benefits of 
the military bases being located within a space where the United States has 
ultimate authority. Many Okinawans were further incensed by the paradoxical 
idea of the United States being in complete control, while also espousing the 
creation of a democratic government in Okinawa. 
Finally, in regards to "Okinawa Key Post in U.S. Defenses" it is important 
to note the author's reference to the improvement in Okinawan schools . While it 
is true that the United States helped fund and build permanent typhoon proof 
school buildings for Okinawa by 1956, the United States ignored this need for at 
least 5 years after the end of World War II. According to Matthew Allen, 
USCAR did not make the rebuilding of schools a priority until the early 1950s, 
25 
"Ryukyu Islands Enjoy Stability ," New York Times, Jan. 13, 1959, p . 80 [online] ; available 
from Proguest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 - 2003) ; accessed April 10, 2006 . 
2 Foster Hailey , "Okinawa Key Post in U.S. Defenses," New York Times, Apr. 28, 1955, p . 14 
[online] ; available from ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 - 2003) ; accessed 
April I 0, 2006 . 
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and did not complete the rebuilding of schools until 1956.27 Clearly, within 
"Okinawa Key Post in U.S. Defenses," the claims of educational benefits gained 
from the United States are overstated when one considers it took eleven years to 
provide Okinawa with even temporary facilities for the schooling of Okinawan 
children. 
It is important, however, to note a difference of opinion to Matthew 
Allen's interpretation of the United States response to the building of permanent 
schools following the Battle of Okinawa. Kensei Yoshida in Democracy 
Betrayed: Okinawa Under US. Occupation claims that education was a rare 
exception of focus for the United States military government in Okinawa. 
Yoshida notes that as early as May 4, 1945 playground facilities were built in 
Ishikawa and that an elementary school was also soon opened. However, while 
Yoshida believes his examples to demonstrate a positive sign of education 
development, they could just as easily be shown to display a lack of interest on 
the part of the United States. The largest and most in-depth example Yoshida 
provides is the construction of the playground, which, while enjoyed by children, 
was hardly an adequate facility for schooling. School supplies such as books, 
pencils, notebooks, etc. are described as having arrived from American charities 
in Hawaii. While this aid might have come from Americans, it would be wrong 
to imply that charity aid arriving in Okinawa is equal to the military government 
taking an active and early interest in education in Okinawa. 28 
27 Matthew Allen, Identity and Resistance in Okinawa (Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield, 
2002), 113. 
28 Yoshida, 34. 
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The orientalization of Okinawa in both the United States military's 
orientation materials for troops and in the press served to provide both the United 
States troops and the civilian population with humanitarian goals of providing aid 
to a needy under-privileged people in the exotic East. Both the exoticization of 
the location and the stated humanitarian goals of their presence served to excite 
the troops and civilian populations of the United States about their involvement or 
stationing in Okinawa. Also, by appealing to a more humanitarian sensibility, the 
article was able to divert attention away from the issues that Okinawan 
reversionists cited as reasons for their opposition to the United States military. 
While the United States military's goals, as has been noted, were to orient 
its troops for their stay in Okinawa and to boost their morale for their mission, the 
military does acknowledge some of the most basic problems surrounding their 
presence in Okinawa. However, these acknowledgements downplay those 
problems and present simplified explanations for why the perceived problems are 
not really problems when viewed with a wide angle lens. 
The most obvious problem with the military bases is the land issue 
surrounding them . In practically every text about Okinawa, the percentage of 
Japan's total land mass represented by Okinawa is compared to the percentage of 
land in Japan used in Okinawa for military bases: as of 1996, Okinawa was .6 
percent of Japan's total land mass, while 75 percent of the United States military 
presence in Japan was based in Okinawa. 29 Given that Okinawa is smaller in land 
29 Withdraw U.S. Bases! : Appeal from Okinawa, Produced by Japan Asia Africa Latin 
America Solidarity Committee, 1998, 20 min., VHS. 
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mass than the state of Rhode Island, this statistic clearly demonstrates just how 
much of Okinawa is taken up by the military bases. 30 
In recognizing the land problem in regards to the military bases, the 
Pocket Guide notes only that the military bases take up space, a valuable 
commodity in Okinawa. 
United States military installations on Okinawa require considerable 
space, some of it arable land. When you consider that only 27 percent of 
Ryukyuan land is arable and how highly the possession ofland is prized, 
you can easily understand why the land occupied by Americans has been a 
source of discontent. 31 
The above quote from the Pocket Guide ignores several other key factors in the 
land issue; the glossing over of these facts served to significantly downplay the 
importance of this problem in the Okinawa. The much larger and 
unacknowledged land problem centers on the means of requisitioning the land by 
the United States military. Most of the land was procured without consent of the 
owner, and later legalized by proclamation of the Occupation Authority. 32 During 
the Battle of Okinawa, the United States military interned the civilian population 
of Okinawa in camps. When the people were allowed to return to their homes 
(sometimes a year to two years after the end of World War II), they found their 
land occupied by United States military installations. Many of these people were 
allowed to continue to farm their land and live on it until 1950, when they were 
forced off of it for the purpose of constructing permanent military bases. 33 
Masahide Ota, in his book Essays on Okinawa Problems, states that the discontent 
30 United States Office of Armed Forces Information and Education, 5. 
31 United States Office of Armed Forces Information and Education, 39. 
32 Ota, 143. 
33 Asato Eiko, "Okinawan Identity and Resistance to Militarization and Maldevelopment ," in 
Islands of Discontent: Okinawan Responses to Japanese and American Power, ed. Laura Hein and Mark 
Selden, 228-242 (Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield, 2003), 230-232. 
17 
of land owners was heightened by the fact that the United States procured the 
majority of the land its bases were located on by seemingly illegal means: in 
violation of "the Hague Rules of War that protect private property rights (Article 
41) and prohibit confiscation and plundering (Article 46)."34 Ota does not give a 
more specific name for the international law that he refers to. However, the 
"Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its 
annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land" ratified 
on July 29, 1899 and signed by the United States says in Article 46: "Family 
honors and rights, individual lives and private property, as well as religious 
convictions and liberty, must be respected. Private property cannot be 
confiscated." 35 I assume that Ota is referring to this law, but Article 41 does not 
correspond to what he has cited. 
While A Pocket Guide to Okinawa does not recognize many of the legal 
arguments against the bases as part of the "land issue," it does address some of 
these legal questions. 
Since 1950, when military government by the United States ended, the 
land used by American forces has been rented from the Okinawan owners. 
The destruction of land ownership records during the war has made it 
difficult in some cases to determine just who owns what land, but on the 
whole the rental arrangement is considered fair by all concerned. 36 
One must wonder what the United States military meant by "all concerned?" 
While the land leases were technically held by the Okinawan land owners, the 
treaties that arranged for the forced leases were negotiated with Japan and not 
34 Ota, 143. 
35 Laws of War.Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II); July 29, 1899 (New Haven, CT: 
The Avalon Project at Yale Law School) [online]; available from 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/hague02.htm; accessed May 4, 2006. 
36 United States Office of Armed Forces Information and Education, 39. 
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with the Okinawan people. 37 And it is certainly no surprise that Japan considered 
the arrangement "fair," given that Japan was able to keep residual sovereignty of 
Okinawa and keep the main islands free of the majority of American military 
installations. More importantly for the United States though was that under the 
terms of the peace treaty signed with Japan and 47 other nations on September 8, 
1951, the Okinawans "lost their legal basis to press the United States for 
compensation for the use of their land prior to April 28, 1952."38 Under the terms 
of this treaty the Okinawans were essentially forced to consider the terms "fair" 
by the United States and Japan. 
The mistruths and omissions of the circumstances surrounding the 
acquisition of the land on which their military bases were built are 
certainly no surprise coming from the United States military. The troops who 
were the audience for A Pocket Guide to Okinawa were being oriented in order to 
not question the military and to believe in the ultimate good that would arise from 
their presence in Okinawa. Also, the branding of the Okinawan population as so 
naturally friendly that their island was frequently called the "Isle of Smiles" and 
"Island of Courtesy" combined with the presentation of "all concerned" with the 
land issue as considering the arrangement "fair" automatically placed those who 
did not consider the arrangement "fair" on the periphery in the minds of the troops 
reading the booklet. 
The intended perception of those who found the land arrangement unfair is 
explicitly stated in A Pocket Guide to Okinawa: the extremist left parties are the 
only parties that advocate immediate Okinawan reversion to Japan. Because the 
37 Yoshida, 41-58. 
38 Yoshida, 51-52. 
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military bases remained when Okinawa reverted to Japan in 1972, it is easy to 
think of reversion and military withdrawal as two separate issues; however, within 
the text of A Pocket Guide to Okinawa reversion is considered equal to 
"immediate departure from Okinawa." 39 The Pocket Guide's presentation of 
those who advocate the immediate removal of the United States presence in 
Okinawa as extreme leftists of course links them to Communism and socialism. 
As has already been stated, the humanitarian aspect of the United States 
military's presence in Okinawa was to modernize the island's facilities, 
strengthen the economy, provide better education opportunities, and spread 
democracy. Since extreme leftists advocated the immediate removal of the 
United States from Okinawa, they were portayed as also opposing modem 
facilities, the strong economy, superior education, and most importantly 
democracy. Those who took issue with the alliance of the United States and 
Japan were portrayed as enemies of the state. After all, one of the primary goals 
of the location of military bases in Okinawa was to aid in preventing the spread of 
Communism throughout Asia.40 It does not take a gigantic leap to determine what 
the United States military wanted to say about those who sought immediate 
reversion to Japan when it associates them with the extreme left movement. 
While the military, again, is expected to attempt to orient its troops in such 
a manner as to maintain the highest possible morale, one also finds a similar 
usage of the land issue narrative within the press, just as with the orientalization 
of the island and its people. The New York Times coverage of Kamejiro Senaga's 
election as the mayor of Naha, the capital of Okinawa, in 1956 provides an 
39 United States Office of Armed Forces Information and Education, 41. 
40 United States Office of Armed Forces Information and Education, 9. 
excellent example of how the paper parallels The Pocket Guide in its message 
about American land use on Okinawa. 
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Kamejiro Senaga was the leader of the Okinawan People's Party, which 
the United States considered to be of Communist orientation. Senaga's election 
in 1956 was not the first time he had caught the attention of the United States 
government. Senaga had played an active role in the political landscape since at 
least 1952, and in 1954 was arrested and sentenced to two years hard labor for 
harboring two men active in the reversion movement who had been expelled from 
Okinawa. 41 Directly after Senaga's release in 1956, he ran for election as the 
mayor of Naha. While Naha was only one city, the United States government and 
media considered the mayoral election as a referendum on the United States Civil 
Administration. 42 The Americans viewed him as a "Communist" threat, but the 
Okinawans saw Senaga as "a folk hero fighting for their cause defiantly and 
almost single-handedly against powerful foreign authorities." 43 Senaga won the 
election, but he would not be able to enjoy his victory for very long. 
The election of a Communist in a democratic election under the 
supervision of the United States was very damaging to the perception of USCAR 
and its aims. The United States struggled to find ways to oust Senaga as soon as 
he took office. The Bank of the Ryukyus, controlled by US CAR, froze all 
financial assistance to the Naha govemment. 44 Also, around 300 local business 
leaders initiated a policy of non-cooperation with the Senaga government. The 
41 Yoshida, 59. 
42 Robert Trumbull, "U.S. Seen as Loser in Okinawa Vote," New York Times, Jan. 12, 1958, p. 17 
[ online ]; available from ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times ( 1851 - 2003); accessed 
April I 0, 2006. 
43 Yoshida, 81. 
44 Watanabe, 157. 
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CJ.A. also "began funneling money to pro-U.S., anti-Senaga politicians." 45 
Senaga was finally forced from office when General James E. Moore, the High 
Commisioner of the Ryukyus, amended the Local Government Act and Local 
Election Act. The first changed the quorum requirement for the city assembly so 
it could vote no-confidence in the Mayor more easily. Thus, the city assembly 
was able to simply dismiss him. The second law amended by General Moore 
prevented anyone convicted of a crime to run for office. 46 Senaga, of course, 
would thus be disqualified from running again, because of his former arrest and 
jail time. However, General Moore's actions may have only further strengthened 
the People's Party, since the election for Senaga's successor was won by yet 
another People's Party backed candidate, Saichi Kaneshi. 
Robert Trumbull, a foreign correspondent for The New York Times, often 
wrote articles on Okinawa. Between 1950 and 1972 he wrote no less than 40 such 
articles that predominantly dealt with the "Communist threat" both within and 
without the Okinawan islands. One such article, "Okinawa: 'Sometimes Painful' 
Lesson for Us," discusses the election ofKamejiro Senaga as the Mayor ofNaha 
in 1956. Senaga was the leader of the Okinawa People's Party, the left-most party 
in Okinawa. 47 While the election of Senaga common-sensically suggests that 
those located on the far left had popular support, Trumbull wrote the article to 
maintain the representation ofleftists as few and far between; the same view 
found in A Pocket Guide to Okinawa. Trumbull's article reads like an excuse for 
why the Okinawan people elected a Communist: they were duped and did not 
45 Yoshida, 82 
46 Yoshida, 82 and Watanabe, 157-158. 
47 Kozy K. Amemiya, "The Bolivian Connection: U.S. Bases and Okinawan Emigration," in 
Okinawa: Cold War Island, ed. Chalmers Johnson, 53-69 (Cardiff, CA: Japan Policy Research Institute, 
1999), 60. 
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actually desire what Senaga desired. Trumbull's primary goal was to produce an 
argument that would allow him to not contradict the thought that the vast majority 
of Okinawans understood the benefits brought to Okinawa by the United States. 
The argument also needed to maintain that Okinawans did not desire the 
immediate removal of the United States presence. Finally, the argument had to 
explain how, despite both these previous points, the city ofNaha could elect a 
Communist whose election campaign slogan was "Yankees, Go Home!" 48 
In order to maintain the idea that Okinawans did not really feel unsatisfied 
with the United States military bases located on their islands, Trumbull presents 
the contrasting images of the standard of living enjoyed by the American forces 
and the standard of living enjoyed by the Okinawans. Trumbull's argument 
centers on the fact that while the Okinawans enjoyed a standard of living much 
higher than that of the pre-war period they were embittered because they were 
constantly subjected to the sights of the highest standard ofliving in the world. 
According to Trumbull, "the Okinawan knows he is better off than he was before 
th Am · ,,49 e encans came .... 
Also, Trumbull after establishing this fact, even blatantly states the view 
that the majority of Okinawans do not desire the immediate withdrawal of the 
United States: "the Communists and their supporters, however, differ from the 
others [political parties] in demanding that the Americans get out right now. Few 
Okinawans appear to be serious about this. "5° Considering Trumbull previously 
noted in his article that Senaga campaigned on the platform of "Yankees, Go 
48 Robert Trumbull, "Okinawa: Sometimes Painful Lesson for Us," New York Times, Apr. 7, 
1957, p. 225 [online]; available from ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 - 2003); 
accessed April IO, 2006. 
49 Trumbull, "Okinawa: Sometimes Painful Lesson for Us," 225. 
50 Trumbull, "Okinawa: Sometimes Painful Lesson for Us," 225. 
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Home," Trumbull obviously feels he has vanquished the notion that Okinawans 
actually support Senaga. Indeed, Trumbull implies Senaga's victory is nothing 
more than "Communist-led exploitation of Okinawan grievances and 
frustrations ."51 Finally, in order to complete his argument, Trumbull presents 
how the Okinawans actually feel, since they apparently do not actually support 
Senaga. 
It is widely said by Okinawans as well as Americans that continual 
agitation for reversion to Japan would abate if Washington were to say 
that abandonment of the Ryukyus would not be considered for a stated 
number of years . Many also think that Washington should initiate a 
thoughtfully conceived, long-range program for economic and social 
development to replace the more or less limited and uncertain operation 
that has been in effect since 1945.52 
Trumbull's words are very clear in meaning: Okinawans do not want immediate 
withdrawal by United States forces, instead they simply desire a timetable for 
eventual reversion to Japan and, moreover, if the United States makes their 
development plans clearer to the Okinawans, the Okinawans would be less likely 
to be exploited by the Communists. 
By using such an argument, Trumbull accomplished the establishment of 
the American presence as a benefit to the Okinawan people, but also made use of 
the same orientalist strategy previously discussed. The Okinawans, after all, were 
the people who had allowed themselves to become embittered despite the benefits 
they had gained from the American presence. Trumbull's argument suggests the 
United States did not really do anything wrong, but instead, the United States was 
not clear enough in its actions for the Okinawans to have truly understood how 
good they have it. 
51 Trumbull, "Okinawa: Sometimes Painful Lesson for Us," 225. 
52 Trumbull, "Okinawa: Sometimes Painful Lesson for Us," 225. 
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One of the few exceptions to Trumbull's argument that the United States' 
actions had not been the source of the problem was his apparent belief that the 
United States should allow the Okinawans to elect their chief executive by 
popular vote. Until 1968, the chief executive was appointed by the deputy-
governor and governor ( after 1957 by the High Commissioner of the Ryukyus). 
For Trumbull, using the lack of democracy within Okinawa as one of his few 
points of contention against USCAR only strengthens his position as a forward 
thinking and civilized authority on the issue. Seeing that Trumbull often uses the 
first person plural when referring to the United States, it would seem that 
Trumbull's attempt to place himself as a righteous person looking out for the 
interests of the Okinawans would also reflect on the United States as well. In 
some sense then, Trumbull's stance against United States policy presents the 
United States in a better light. The point seems contradictory, but Trumbull was 
out-democratizing the United States; therefore, it was an acceptable point of 
dissension. 
Though Trumbull feels the United States should allow the Okinawans to 
elect their own chief executive, very clearly he intended for that executive to 
remain pro-United States. Trumbull does note after all (presumably because 
Okinawa democratically elected a Communist) that Okinawa is "far" from a 
showcase of democracy. 53 If Trumbull advocates democracy (which Communists 
are excluded from), then he must expect that democracy to be pro-American (at 
the very least acceptable to USCAR). 
53 Trumbull, "Okinawa: Sometimes Painful Lesson for Us," 225. 
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Trumbull also believed that a pro-American, non-Communist would be 
elected as chief executive because Trumbull presents the Okinawan people as 
eager to learn the advantages of democracy. 54 The implication is that the 
institution of democracy, rather than the removal of the military bases, would 
solve Okinawa's problem(s). Trumbull, of course, already had established the 
representation of the military bases and the United States presence in Okinawa as 
beneficial. In fact, without the military bases and the United States, the 
Okinawans probably would be incapable of a democratic government, according 
to Trumbull's representation. Also, because the deputy-governor and governor 
(after 1957, the High Commissioner) would still hold near supreme power in 
Okinawa even if the chief executive were popularly elected, how much more 
democratic Okinawa would have become from such an amendment is debatable. 
Trumbull's view of the United States as the agent of democracy and social 
betterment in Okinawa also led to Trumbull's skewed view on the likely 
Okinawan reaction to possible reforms made by the United States. 
By Trumbull's argument, Okinawans are represented as unable to discern 
the traps set by Communists in order to gain the support of the Okinawans. 
Because of this fact, the United States needed to increase, rather than decrease, its 
vigilance over the islands by being clearer in its actions, so the Okinawans could 
more easily grasp the greatness of the United States presence in Okinawa. 
Trumbull's argument achieved all of the goals necessary in order to 
maintain the consistent view that is also laid out in A Pocket Guide to Okinawa. 
The United States military presence is established by both Trumbull and the 
k Trumbull, "Okinawa: Sometimes Painful Lesson for Us," 225. 
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Pocket Guide as necessary for the exotic, backward Okinawans to develop both 
economically and culturally. 
Senaga's place within the American military bases extends beyond simply 
his election to the Naha mayoral office. One year after being elected, Senaga was 
forced from office; again the story appeared in The New York Times.55 Atsushi 
Toriyama, in his essay "Okinawa's 'Postwar': Some Observations on the 
Formation of American Military Bases in the Aftermath of Terrestrial Warfare," 
has interpreted the United States role in Senaga's removal as an attempt by the 
USCAR to persuade the Okinawan populace that only through America and 
democracy could Okinawa benefit. 56 Okinawans on the other hand perceived the 
outcome of Senaga's administration as directly related to the progress of 
Okinawa. 57 
In the election to replace Senaga it became virtually impossible for the 
United States to ignore the discontent of the Okinawans. However, while The 
New York Times articles did report on the discontent of the islanders, at no time 
does the role of the military bases within the grander scheme of Okinawan history 
change. 58 The military bases remain the key to not only United States defense, 
but also to the progress and development of the Okinawan people. 
Even while the United States involvement in the ouster of Senaga is noted, 
many statements within articles about Senaga both before and after his ouster 
suggest Senaga himself was the real problem in Okinawa. On November 24, 
1957 The New York Times ran the article "Red Mayor is Urged to Quit in 
55 
"Okinawans Oust Pro-Red Mayor," New York Times, Nov. 25, 1957, p. 17 [online]; available 
from Pro~uest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 - 2003); accessed April l 0, 2006. 
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57 T oriyama, 412. 
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Okinawa." The article began: "the pro-Communist Mayor ofNaha, Kamejiro 
Senaga, was under fire today to resign from office before he ruined the city."59 
Having already noted the Communist, anti-United States stance ofKamejiro 
Senaga in "Okinawa: Sometimes Painful Lesson for Us," Robert Trumbull on 
January 12, 1958 argued that Lieut. Gen. James E. Moore "had to change" the 
quorum rules of the Naha City Assembly in order to solve the boycott "by the 
twelve pro-Communist members." 60 
These articles' placing of agency with the "Communist" or "pro-
Communist" Senaga (and his supporters), is important because it did not critique 
the United States administration of Okinawa. The articles' critical judgment was 
reserved for the "Communist Senaga." Because the Communists are presented as 
the cause of the problem, General Moore's actions become a necessary 
consequence, according to Trumbull. Thus, it also serves to deflect criticism of 
the United States' role in ousting Senaga because Senaga is presented as ruining 
the city. 
The presentation of those branded as "leftists" or "Communists" by the 
United States as political enemies is certainly not specific to Okinawa and was of 
course a common feature of the Cold War. Indeed, in "Leftists in Japan Exploit 
U.S. Step," The New York Times published a piece which bemoaned the fact that a 
particular military policy (namely the storage of atomic weapons on Okinawa) 
59 
"Red Mayor is Urged to Quit in Okinawa," New York Times, Nov. 24, 1957, p. 2 [online]; 
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provided political fodder for the "leftist opposition" in mainland Japan.61 The 
article specifically referenced "the Japanese Socialist party, the leftist student 
organizations and the Communist-tainted General Council of Trade Unions" as all 
having used the atomic bomb storage issue to attempt to influence the Diet 
elections in mainland Japan. 
Through the establishment of the "Communists" as the political enemy on 
Okinawa both the military and press are able to prevent the need to admit fault 
with the United States military presence itself, and just as with the strategy of 
orientalizing the population of Okinawa itself, the ultimate solution is not removal 
of the United States bases, but instead a reformed policy for Okinawa that would 
in fact increase vigilance and interest in the islands on the part of the United 
States. 
Akio Watanabe, in his book The Okinawa Problem, published in 1970, 
analyzes the portrayal of Senaga affair within the Japanese media, primarily the 
Asahi Shinbun. Unsurprisingly, while The New York Times maintained that the 
United States was a necessary and helpful father figure assisting Okinawa in 
setting up its own democracy, the Asahi Shinbun, according to Watanabe, referred 
to the United States presence in Okinawa as "'colonial rule,"' and using 
"'undemocratic methods. "' 62 
The plight of the Okinawan people as caught between two super-powers is 
further highlighted by the press coverage of the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 
61 Robert Trumbull, "Leftists in Japan Exploit U.S. Step," New York Times, Jun. 24, 1956, p. 19 
[online] ; available from ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 - 2003); accessed 
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1972. The coverage of protesters in Okinawa and frequently Okinawans in 
general was meant to orientalize them as unready and unworthy of making 
decisions for themselves. They were infected by the Communist agenda and 
needed America's help to get back on the correct course. By the late 1960s, the 
pressure on the Japanese government to address the Okinawa problem had 
reached the point that Eisaku Sato, the Prime Minister of Japan, made the 
reversion of Okinawa a key point in his agenda. 63 
As it became clearer to the Americans that the reversion demands of the 
Japanese would be hard to deny, the Japan/American relationship took precedence 
over the military strategic desires of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A 1966 inter-
agency study group, established to review the reversion question, concluded that 
Okinawa should be returned to Japan by 1970 to prevent "a series of events in 
Japan and endanger the very existence of the U.S.-Japan security treaty due for 
renewal. "64 
The admission that relations between Japan and the United States took 
precedence over the military bases also symbolically made Japan an equal to the 
United States. Sato noted that the return of Okinawa would represent the end of 
the post-war period for Japan.65 The implication, of course, being that Japan's 
status in relation to the United States would thus cease to be that of the conquered 
and become equal to the United States. Japan would thus take Okinawa back . 
Okinawa, of course, remained the inferior, exotic, oriental being handed from one 
authority to another. 
63 Yoshida, 136. 
64 Yoshida, 138. 
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In .1968, the Office of Information for the Armed Services, Department of 
Defense published an updated version of the Pocket Guide to Okinawa . The 1968 
version was revised to reflect the changing United States and Japanese 
perspectives on Okinawa, as well as to update more administrative issues such as 
the change from the governor/deputy-governor to the High Commissioner 
authority in USCAR. 
Some of the key differences in how Okinawa was now portrayed to the 
troops was a drastic shortening and modification of the background history of 
Okinawa. While in 1961 the history of Okinawa was divided into three sections 
(Chinese influence, Japanese influence, World War II) which did not stress any 
necessary cultural links to Japan, the 1968 version of the Pocket Guide eliminated 
the separate Chinese influence section altogether. Japan also is no longer 
depicted as a foreign power exacting allegiance from the Okinawans. Instead of 
citing Okinawans as having descended from the Ainu, an ethnic minority which is 
thought to have populated Japan prior to the arrival of present day Japanese, the 
Okinawans are now depicted as "proud of their ties to Japan, which are centuries 
old. "66 While the original 1961 document did note a particular folk tale that 
claims an inherent Japanese connection to Okinawa, what is stressed more is the 
importance of Okinawa as an intermediary between Japan and China. While it 
was subservient to both, it was depicted as decidedly independent from both. The 
1968 version places a greater amount of importance on the folk tale simply by 
eliminating much of the other information that had previously accompanied it in 
the 1961 version. The 1968 version also now stressed the relative unimportance 
66 United States Office oflnformation for the Armed Forces Department of Defense , A Pocket 
Guide to Okinawa (Washington: Department of Defense, 1968), 12. 
of China in modem Okinawa in favor of stating Japan's "establishment of de 
facto control over the Ryukyus by force in 1609." 67 
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Japan was still portrayed as the agent of advancement and the Ryukyus as 
the backward prefecture that was unable to adopt the Western-like Japanese 
economic and technological innovations. However, much of the rest of the 
information regarding Japan's rule of Okinawa once it was made a prefecture in 
1879 was removed. References to ethnic discrimination by Japanese against 
Okinawans also were removed. 68 
In describing the people of Okinawa, the 1968 version enhanced the image 
of a necessary and historical Japanese/Okinawan connection. Each version 
contains a section entitled "Meet the People." A comparison of the opening 
sentence of each version illustrates the extreme difference in portrayal of the 
Okinawan people by the United States. The 1961 version states: "Traces of 
ancient Chinese culture and philosophy can still be found in the Ryukyus, but the 
Ryukyuans are more like the Japanese than they are the Chinese or any other 
people." 69 Seven years later in 1968 the opening has been changed: "The average 
Ryukyuan resembles his Japanese cousin in appearance." 70 The vast difference in 
intention and meaning of the opening sentence is apparent immediately. The lack 
of any reference at all to the Chinese influence in Okinawa is of course 
immediately striking and fairly self-explanatory. The use of the word "cousin" to 
denote the relationship between Okinawa and Japan is more interesting. The 
metaphor carries with it implications of a genetic relationship, which of course 
67 United States Office oflnfonnation for the Anned Forces Department of Defense, 12. 
68 United States Anned Forces Office oflnfonnation and Education, 19. 
69 United States Anned Forces Office oflnfonnation and Education, 47. 
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would imply a necessary ethnic if not cultural link to Japan. The term cousin also 
allows for some distance between the Japanese and Okinawans . The United 
States must portray the Okinawans as inferior and subservient to Japan in order to 
maintain an orientalized image of Okinawa while accepting Japan as a political 
and economic equal. 
With the need to maintain some distance between the Japanese and 
Okinawan identities, it is important to note that the 1968 version has not 
eliminated all traces of separating the Okinawans from Japanese in identity. In 
fact, later in the "Meet the People" section of the 1968 version it is stated that 
"Ryukyuans have always maintained their own identity." 71 However, in order to 
maintain the Japanese as superior to the Okinawans, some element of separate 
cultural identity is necessary. If the Ryukyuans were equal to the Japanese and 
the Japanese are prepared and capable of having a self-governing democracy, the 
question of why Okinawa needs the United States or Japan would immediately 
become an issue. Again "Meet the People" in the 1968 version noted that 
Ryukyuans were the "cousin" of the Japanese, not a brother or any other more 
closely related familial relationship. 
While Sato did push the United States to get a deal done on reversion from 
the time he took office in 1965, he did not push for removal of the United States 
military bases as many Okinawans hoped would coincide with reversion to Japan . 
In Sato's meetings with President Lyndon Johnson, the two men made it clear that 
the United States' and Japan's security issues must be taken into consideration 
along with any question of Okinawan reversion to Japan, the implication being 
71 United States Office oflnformation for the Armed Forces Department of Defense, 13. 
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that reversion would not lead to the reduction of United States military bases in 
Okinawa. 72 In November of 1967 Sato and President Johnson made reversion a 
goal to be reached "'within a few years"'. 73 
In preparation for the reversion, in 1968 President Johnson amended 
Executive Order 10713 to allow the direct election of the Okinawan chief 
executive. 74 Held in November of 1968, the election led to the selection of 
Chobyo Yara, a long time reversion activist, as the chief executive of the 
Ryukyus. Yara was backed by a coalition that included the Okinawan People's 
Party (the same party that Senaga belonged to). The other opposition parties in 
the coalition were the Socialist and Democratic Socialist parties. All three parties 
stood in opposition to the Okinawan Liberal Democratic Party, the party preferred 
by the United States. 75 Yara advocated the immediate and full removal of the 
United States presence in Okinawa. However, unlike Senaga in 1956, Yara was 
not branded a Communist by the United States, and in fact, the High 
Commissioner of Okinawa took a cooperative approach to the new 
administration. 76 The United States' cooperation with Yara is even more striking 
since USCAR and Yara had had political clashes in the past. In 1954, in response 
to a letter Yara had sent Major General David A. D. Ogden, then deputy-governor 
of Okinawa, USCAR made it clear that Yara's position was considered a pro-
Communist one: "'It is regretted that your continuation of reversion agitation in 
Okinawa can result only in confusion for Ryukyuans and comfort to the 
72 Yoshida, 136. 
73 Yoshida, 140. 
74 Yoshida, 141. 
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communists. "' 77 Later the same year USCAR refused to give Yara a passport, 
which he had applied for to pick up a charity collection of 60,000,000 Japanese 
yen for reconstructing schools in Okinawa. 78 However, as chief executive in 
1968, USCAR suddenly had a new view on Yara . Yara's election, unlike that of 
Senaga in 1956, was interpreted by the American administration to show the 
desire for reversion by Okinawans. 
Several issues were sticking points in the debate over the reversion of 
Okinawa. Whether or not the United States would be able to continue to store 
nuclear weapons on Okinawa, and whether or not the United States' bases on 
Okinawa would be subject to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which would require 
the United States to ask Japan's permission before launching assaults from 
Okinawa, were two of the largest issues to stand in the way of reversion. In 1969 
Sato and newly elected President Nixon were able to work out a compromise on 
the issues. The Japanese government agreed to pay $685,000,000 to cover the 
costs of the reversion and to purchase civilian assets that the United States had 
been funding, such as the electric power company. In return the United States 
agreed to remove all nuclear weapons, but their possible re-entry into Okinawa 
was allowed if the United States consulted with the Japanese government and 
could demonstrate a "time of great emergency." 79 It was also agreed that the 
military bases would be subject to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. 
Sato was able to reach an agreement without nuclear weapons and 
without a special exception to the U.S .-Japan Security Treaty in large part because 
of the Nixon administration's Nixon Doctrine. The Nixon Doctrine asked that 
77 Yoshida, 58. 
78 Yoshida, 59. 
79 Yoshida, 160. 
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allies of the United States take more responsibility for their own defense . 80 The 
Nixon Doctrine was introduced because of the failures of the United States 
involvement in the Vietnam War.81 Okinawa officially was returned to Japan on 
May 15, 1972.82 
The New York Times coverage of the reversion follows the change in tone 
of the official American policy . The reaction to the election of Chobyo Yara , for 
instance , provides a stark contrast to the election of Senaga twelve years before. 
Of course, some articles maintained a perspective on the election similar to that 
on the election of Senaga. "Problem of the Ryukyus" by Emerson Chapin, for 
instance, discusses the strain that the election of a Communist might put on 
United States/Japanese relations. 83 However, the extreme change of tone found in 
an article such as "A Tough and Dedicated Okinawan," which The Times 
published on December 17, 1968, cannot be denied. In describing Yara, the 
article never accuses him of being a Communist, or radical extremist. In extreme 
contrast, Yara is said to be "gentle, courteous, a lover of orchids and dedicated to 
the profession ofteaching ."84 When the article does broach the topic ofYara's 
political affiliation, Yara is described as a reluctant candidate who could not 
"ignore his responsibility for service in his native land. "85 Yara is also described 
as requiring that the parties that backed him to "not try to influence his campaign 
promises ... (and] not interfere with his conduct of the office ifhe was elected ."86 
Yara is depicted as a likable man of strong moral fiber, an ardent nationalist, and 
80 Yoshida 158. 
81 Yoshida 158. 
82 Yoshida 163. 
83 "Problem of the Ryukyus ," New York Times , Nov. 12, 1968, p. 3 [online]; available from 
ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times ( 1851 - 2003); accessed April 10, 2006. 
84 "A Tough and Dedicated Okinawan ," 4. 
85 "A Tough and Dedicated Okinawan ," 4. 
86 "A Tough and Dedicated Okinawan ," 4. 
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a devoted family man. Senaga was dismissed out of hand as a Communist 
working for the downfall of the United States. The differences in depiction could 
not be any more drastic. Furthermore, the Pocket Guide and New York Times 
both previously exhibited a tendency to automatically label all extreme 
reversionists as a minority made up ofradical left-wing supporters. Yara on the 
other hand is described by an "American" as "'a pure reversionist ... he has no 
interest whatsoever in ideology. He just wants Okinawa returned to Japan 
because he feels that Okinawa is Japanese."' 87 
Two letters to the editor from late 1968 note the debate over the 
relationship of the Okinawans to Japanese . "The Okinawa Problem," by M. D. 
Morris, gives a typical example of an argument for the total separation of the 
Okinawan people from the Japanese mainland. Stress is placed within the 
historical narrative on the militaristic nature of Japan's incorporation of Okinawa 
into its influence in 1609. Also, the past independence of Okinawa is also 
discussed at length. 88 The opposing letter to the editor was written by the former 
Ambassador to Japan, Edwin 0. Reischauer. Reischauer distances identity from 
history, and places importance on the Okinawans' personal desires. Okinawans, 
he claims, want to be Japanese. Reischauer's conclusion, however, stresses the 
importance of Okinawan reversion to the United States' relationship with Japan, 
and has almost nothing to do with Okinawa. Since Reischauer's argument for 
reversion is based solely on relations with Japan, the implication of course is that 
87 "A Tough and Dedicated Okinawan," 4. 
88 M.D. Morris, "Okinawa Problem," New York Times, Nov. 24, 1968, p. El3 [online]; available 
from ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 - 2003); accessed April 10, 2006. 
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without Japan's influence, the United States would have no reason to hand 
authority of Okinawa over to anyone else, Japanese, Okinawan or otherwise. 89 
As the former ambassador to Japan, it is not surprising that Reischauer's 
argument follows the American political policies of the time, but his article's 
publication in The New York Times would have been unnecessary previous to the 
change in American policy toward reversion. For most of the American rule of 
Okinawa, Okinawa and Okinawans were represented by the American 
government and in the articles from The New York Times as separate from the 
Japanese. The 1961 Pocket Guide to Okinawa stressed the historical narrative in 
almost an identical manner as M. D. Morris in his piece to The Times. With the 
changing political climate The New York Times had become a means through 
which the new government policy can be voiced and disseminated. 
Reischauer's argument notes the importance of Japan/United States 
relations over the strategic military desires of the United States. As noted earlier, 
the admission of the United States that it needed to diplomatically compromise 
with Japan on the reversion question was presented as Japan's coming of age in 
the global world. Japan became an equal to the United States. James P. Brown's 
article "Japan - From Enemy to Protege to Partner," written December 8, 1969, 
presents this very phenomenon, even stating bluntly: "President Nixon's 
agreement to return Okinawa to Japanese administration in 1972 removed the last 
onerous symbol of Japan's subservience after its defeat in World War 11."90 
89 Edwin 0 . Reischauer , "Ryukyu Islands ," New York Times, Dec. I , 1968, p . El 1 [online]; 
available from ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 - 2003) ; accessed April 10 
2006 . ' 
90 James P. Brown, "Japan - From Enemy to Protege to Partner ," New York Times, Dec. 8, 1969, 
p. 46 [online]; available from ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 - 2003)· 
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Brown goes on to point out the emergence of the powerful Japanese economy as a 
reason for allowing Japan to remove the last "symbol of [it's] subservience." 
Japan, Brown notes, has promised to "play a greater role in the economic 
development of Asia, consistent with [it's] own economic growth." 91 The 
presentation of Japan as a kind of child of America that is now ready to leave the 
house and raise children of its own is very obvious here. 
While Japan was now represented as the equal of the United States, the 
Okinawan people continued to be represented as inferior to the Japanese mainland 
within The New York Times. John K. Emmerson's March 9, 1972 article, 
"Troubles Ahead for Okinawa," details the seemingly perplexing situation that 
despite the fact that the reversion had been decided upon and Okinawa was set to 
become part of Japan once again, many Okinawans now opposed the reversion. 
Since the Okinawans had advocated reversion almost as long as the Americans 
had controlled Okinawa, Emmerson discusses why he feels the Okinawans had 
taken an anti-reversion stance. Emmerson's article continues to represent the 
Okinawans as unable to grasp political situations. He presents them as hopelessly 
blinded by the thought that their protests make a difference: 
since the bases will go - sooner or later and not because of Okinawan 
protests but because of American policy - it is the dismay over return to 
Japan which may surprise Americans who for years heard pleas to release 
the Okinawans from long servitude under American domination. 92 
There are several key things to note about the passage. Emmerson presents the 
Okinawans as unable to recognize that there is no need to protest because, as 
Emmerson puts it, "the bases will go - sooner or later." Next, the emphasis on 
91 Brown, 46. 
92 John K. Emmerson, "Troubles Ahead for Okinawa," New York Times, Mar. 9, 1972, p. 41 
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the confusing action of the Okinawans who advocated reversion for so long, but 
now that reversion is upon them, do not want it. Emmerson's article represents 
Okinawans as an orientalized, child-like people who cannot make up their minds 
and cannot see what is best for them. Again, the representation of Okinawans as 
an inferior people is consistent with both the original and revised Pocket Guide to 
Okinawa. 
After the reversion, articles such as "Okinawa's Reversion," which 
appeared May 15, I 972, further highlights Okinawa's inferiority to Japan and the 
United States. The article adopts a self-congratulatory attitude toward the 
reversion. 
Few colonial renunciations in history have been wholly voluntary or 
altruistic .... Nevertheless, at this moment of bad conscience over 
Vietnam, Americans are entitled to take some pride in the enlitted self-
interest that has brought about the return of Okinawa to Japan. 3 
The use of the word "enlightened" raises several issues. First, the United States, 
of course, is being represented in a very favorable light. It implies also that the 
United States knows best what is good for Okinawa. The status of the United 
States as "enlightened" also excludes Okinawa from being able to know best what 
is good for itself. Furthermore, the author notes at the end of the article the irony 
that many Okinawans are "having second thoughts about the transfer from 
Washington's suzerainty to Tokyo's under the centralized system of Japanese 
prefectural administration." 94 Combined with the previous representation of the 
United States as "enlightened" there is only one way to interpret the Okinawan's 
93 "Okinawa's Reversion," New York Times, May 15, 1972, p. 34 [online]; available from 
ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 - 2003); accessed April 10, 2006. 
94 "Okinawa's Reversion," 34. 
hesitancy toward the reversion: the Okinawans do not know what is best for 
themselves, since they cannot see the "enlightened" way. 
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The representations of the Okinawan military base problem in The New 
York Times during the American civil administration of the islands have been 
shown to follow the policies of the United States government. The parallel has 
been shown in comparison to both secondary accounts of United States political 
policy and also in comparison to Department of Defense published manuals for 
the orientation of its troops posted to Okinawa. Despite changing policies 
towards the islands, ending eventually in the reversion of the islands to Japan, the 
presentation of the relationship between the United States and Okinawa was 
always maintained to be a dominant/subservient one. The orientalization of the 
Okinawans resulted in the presentation of Okinawans as inferior, unable to help 
themselves, unable to recognize the "enlightened" view of the United States and 
unable to grasp basic political issues. The United States on the other hand is 
consistently rendered as just the opposite. It is shown as a parent-like figure 
helping along the helpless and vulnerable Okinawans. The military bases 
themselves of course highlight the relationship as America the protector, Okinawa 
the protected. Beyond just the military bases though, Okinawans were 
represented as vulnerable to Communism and radical left-wing propaganda. 
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